#### 2 3 4 5 6 BEFORE THE HEARING EXAMINER CITY OF SEATTLE 7 Hearing Examiner File: In the Matter of the Appeal of: 8 MUP-12-016(W) 9 **BRUCE STRUTHERS** RESPONDENTS' REPLY RE: MOTION 10 from a SEPA decision issued by the Director, TO DISMISS Department of Planning and Development 11 12 INTRODUCTION I. 13 Appellant appears to regard the DPD decision that is under appeal as a "permission to 14 proceed" whose appeal can be a vehicle for Appellant to raise any objections he may have to the 15

1

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

proceed" whose appeal can be a vehicle for Appellant to raise any objections he may have to the Meadowbrook Pond Detention Facility Dredging and Improvements Project (the "Project").

That is not the case. The decision under appeal is a DPD decision imposing substantive SEPA conditions on the Project. Whether an EIS should have been prepared, whether a shoreline

substantial development permit should have been required, and whether the Project complies

with various non-SEPA requirements are all beyond the permissible scope of this appeal.

To obtain his requested relief, Appellant must show that DPD erred by failing to exercise its substantive SEPA authority to mitigate adverse environmental impacts of the proposal.

Frankly, Appellant has provided no detailed explanation regarding the adverse impacts that he

RESPONDENTS' REPLY RE: MOTION TO DISMISS - 1

Peter S. Holmes Seattle City Attorney 600 Fourth Avenue, 4th Floor P.O. Box 94769 Seattle, WA 98124-4769 (206) 684-8200

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

Examiner should promptly dismiss it.

#### It is too late for Appellant to challenge the DNS and request an EIS. A.

asserts will result from the proposal. In any event, however, the City lacks substantive SEPA

authority to impose the conditions or grant the relief requested by Appellant. Of particular

importance, the City lacks authority to deny the Project under SEPA where no EIS has been

prepared. Indeed, Appellant essentially concedes the lack of SEPA substantive authority to

support his requested relief by failing to address virtually every legal argument contained in

Respondents' Motion to Dismiss. Given this failure, the appeal is utterly without merit and the

In his Response to Respondents' Motion to Dismiss ("Response"), Appellant again requests that an EIS be prepared. However, as set forth in Respondents' Motion to Dismiss, Appellant's failure to timely appeal the March 8, 2012, DNS precludes such a claim, and Appellant's Response never addresses or rebuts the well-established law on this score.

In light of the foregoing, the large portions of Appellant's Response that challenge the DNS are irrelevant and must be disregarded. In the section of his Response entitled "Underassessment of environmental impact," Appellant suggests that the proposal at issue in this case did not change from the proposal that was the subject of the previous DNS that SPU issued and then withdrew in 2011.<sup>2</sup> The purported legal significance of this allegation is unclear, but the allegation is incorrect as a factual matter. The proposal that was the subject of the previous DNS included a work item to "[m]odify the existing diversion structure for the overflow pipe at the upstream end of the project to improve the Thornton Creek flowpath into the structure"; the work

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> See Response, p. 7.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> *Id.*, p. 5.

included removing the north corner of the concrete structure.<sup>3</sup> That work item was removed from the proposal that is at issue in this case.<sup>4</sup>

Appellant's Response then alleges that SPU erred in its evaluation of the impacts of the proposal prior to issuing the March 8, 2012, DNS; suggests that the proposed work really would change the flow characteristics of the existing upstream inlet to the high flow bypass; and requests preparation of an EIS.<sup>5</sup> However, the propriety of the March 8, 2012, DNS is now beyond challenge. Similarly, the sections of Appellant's Response entitled "Expert advice ignored" and "A SEPA responsible official's duty" deal with whether SPU properly issued a DNS.<sup>6</sup> Such discussion is irrelevant at this point.

# B. There is no substantive SEPA authority to support Appellant's requested relief.

Incredibly, Appellant's Response suggests that Respondents' Motion to Dismiss, by focusing on the issue of substantive SEPA conditioning, "completely misses the point of the appeal." On the contrary, the DPD decision that is under appeal is a decision imposing conditions pursuant to substantive SEPA authority. There is no question that much of Appellant's requested relief – and the *only* portion of Appellant's requested relief that could be timely and within the Examiner's jurisdiction – consists of requesting that the Examiner impose various conditions that DPD declined to impose (or otherwise grant certain relief desired by

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> See Environmental Checklist, August 29, 2011, pp. 4-5 (on file with Examiner in case no. W-11-008).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> See Environmental Checklist, February 29, 2012, pp. 3-5, Declaration of Greg Stevens ("Stevens Decl."), Ex. A. The current proposal simply calls for adding a second trash rack at the inlet and related work. *Id.*, p. 5. The checklist for the current proposal clearly specifies that "[t]he project would not alter any flow control features affecting Thornton Creek or the Pond, including the high flow bypass pipe inlet. ." *Id.*, p. 3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> See Response, pp. 5-7.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> *Id.*, pp. 7-9. Under the SEPA regulations, the "responsible official" makes the threshold determination – here, a DNS. SMC 25.05.788, SMC 25.05.797. The DPD decision under appeal, by contrast, deals with substantive SEPA conditioning.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> See Response, p. 2.

RESPONDENTS' REPLY RE: MOTION TO DISMISS - 4

Appellant, regardless of whether one characterizes that relief as a "condition") utilizing the City's substantive SEPA authority.

To prevail, Appellant must therefore show that DPD erred by failing to exercise its substantive SEPA authority to mitigate adverse environmental impacts of the proposal. As a threshold matter, it bears emphasis that Appellant has (even at this late date) provided scant detail regarding the adverse impacts that he asserts will result from the proposal. A primary concern of Appellant appears to be that the existing Meadowbrook Pond facility has deficiencies that the proposal will not address – or that the benefits of the improvements will not be worth the cost. This is not an issue of mitigation for adverse impacts under SEPA. Similarly, Appellant has ideas about how the effectiveness of the facility allegedly could be improved (which SPU has not proposed to implement). By contrast, Appellant says little about the adverse environmental impacts that he believes would result from the proposal. Appellant's Response (at p. 3) states that "Meadowbrook Outfall is where the significant environmental and flow effects of the project are experienced," but Appellant offers little detail as to what those effects would be.

However, even if the proposal would have adverse environmental impacts, the City can exercise substantive SEPA authority to mitigate those impacts only in compliance with the strict limitations of SEPA and its implementing regulations. Respondents' Motion to Dismiss fully explained the reasons why there is no substantive SEPA authority for imposition of the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> See Response, p. 3 ("No evidence presented by Seattle Public Utilities explains how the design deficiencies of the Meadowbrook Detention Pond are addressed by the proposed 'improvements'."); see also Appellant's Response to Respondents' Motion to Quash, p. 7 (raising issue of whether proposed modifications to facility will achieve SPU's design goals and whether there will be measurable benefits from improvements costing "millions of dollars").

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> See Response, p. 8 (contending that effectiveness of pond would be increased if upstream inlet to high flow bypass were blocked).

conditions/granting of the relief requested by Appellant.<sup>10</sup> However, Appellant's Response utterly fails to rebut those points.

1. The City may deny a project under its substantive SEPA authority only if an EIS has been prepared.

Appellant concedes that his requests to prohibit all tree removal and vegetation disturbance, prohibit the proposed work at the inlet to the high flow bypass, prohibit the widening of the asphalt pathway to that inlet, prohibit modification of the forebay trash rack, and prohibit construction of maintenance roads to the forebay essentially constitute a request to deny the Project. Indeed, Appellant fails to identify a single element of the Project (other than mitigation-type elements such as habitat improvements) that he would allow to go forward.

As set forth in Respondents' Motion to Dismiss, SEPA authorizes denial of a project under the City's substantive SEPA authority only when an EIS has been prepared -- which has not occurred in this case, and cannot occur now due to Appellant's failure to timely appeal the DNS. Appellant does not dispute that this is the law. Moreover, Appellant never addresses or rebuts Respondents' point that the City's SEPA policies do not support the foregoing requests. Thus, the foregoing requests for relief (whether or not they are regarded as "conditions") must be dismissed as a matter of law.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> See Motion to Dismiss, pp. 6-18.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> See SMC 25.05.665.A.2 ("The decisionmaker may deny a proposed project if an environmental impact statement has been prepared and if reasonable mitigating measures are insufficient to mitigate significant, adverse impacts identified in the environmental impact statement."); see also RCW 43.21C.060 ("In order to deny a proposal under this chapter, an agency must find that: (1) The proposal would result in significant adverse impacts identified in a final or supplemental environmental impact statement prepared under this chapter; and (2) reasonable mitigation measures are insufficient to mitigate the identified impact.").

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> These requests correspond to items 3 through 6 in the list on page 7 of Respondents' Motion to Dismiss. Similarly, Appellant never addresses or rebuts that the City lacks substantive SEPA authority to prohibit the proposed work at the upstream inlet to the high flow bypass where there is no SEPA environmental document that identifies a specific, adverse environmental impact resulting from the proposed work at that inlet to the high flow bypass. *See* Motion to Dismiss, pp. 10-12.

## 2. The City may not use its substantive SEPA authority to address preexisting conditions.

Appellant also never addresses or rebuts that Appellant's requests to "daylight" the high flow bypass pipeline and remove the concrete foundation of the abandoned Lake City Sewage Treatment Plant address preexisting conditions and as such cannot be mandated under SEPA substantive authority. Thus, these requests must also be dismissed as a matter of law. 13

# 3. Appellant fails to create an issue of fact that his requested monitoring conditions are justified.

Appellant's Response does address Respondents' contentions regarding Appellant's request for conditions imposing various monitoring requirements. However, Appellant fails to create any issue of material fact suggesting that the City has substantive SEPA authority to impose those conditions.

First, with respect to Appellant's request for enhanced instrumentation and monitoring of the pond, including flow rate monitors and temperature gauges at all inlets and outlets, Respondents' Motion to Dismiss pointed out -- based on a declaration by the lead designer of the Project (a professional engineer) -- that such a condition would serve no purpose in light of the nature of the facility and thus cannot be imposed under substantive SEPA authority. Appellant's only response is two sentences in his Response in which the Appellant (a layperson) gives his *own* characterization of the functioning of various elements depicted on a schematic

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> These requests correspond to items 1 and 2 in the list on page 7 of Respondents' Motion to Dismiss. Appellant also never addresses or rebuts that the City lacks substantive SEPA authority to deny certain elements of the Project because of their alleged inconsistency with the proposed, later Confluence Project (item 9 in the foregoing list).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> See Motion to Dismiss, pp. 15-16, and Declaration of Mike Hrachovec.

diagram. This is scarcely sufficient to question the conclusions of a professional engineer, who has personally designed the Project, regarding the functioning of the facility.

Second, with respect to Appellant's request for imposition of the monitoring requirements that would apply to a Combined Sewer Overflow (CSO) under the citywide CSO Long Term Control Plan, Respondents' Motion to Dismiss pointed out – based on a declaration by the City's CSO Reduction Program Manager (a civil engineer) – that Meadowbrook Pond and the high flow bypass pipeline that carries stormwater to Lake Washington simply do not constitute a CSO.<sup>16</sup>

As the City's CSO Reduction Program Manager explained, a CSO arises where sewer pipes are designed to carry both sanitary sewage and stormwater, and the high flow bypass pipeline associated with Meadowbrook Pond is only designed to carry stormwater and thus is not a combined sewer. Appellant states in his Response that "the Sand Point Tunnel, now used as a high flow bypass pipeline, was designed and constructed to carry treated sewage and storm water from the Lake City Sewage Treatment Plant." However, as Appellant admits, the Lake City Sewage Treatment Plant is long defunct (witness Appellant's request that the foundation of the old plant be removed from the pond). Regardless of the original purpose of any facilities related to that plant, it is undisputed that the high flow bypass pipeline associated with

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> See Response, p. 7.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> See Motion to Dismiss, pp. 14-15, and Declaration of Andrew Lee ("Lee Decl.").

 $<sup>^{17}</sup>$  See Lee Decl., ¶¶ 3, 5. Mr. Lee's description of what constitutes a CSO is thus entirely consistent with the SEPA environmental checklist for an unrelated project that Appellant quotes in his Response. See Response, p. 11.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> See Response, p. 11.

RESPONDENTS' REPLY RE: MOTION TO DISMISS - 8

Meadowbrook Pond is currently designed to carry only stormwater. <sup>19</sup> Appellant's suggestion that a CSO exists based on a long-terminated prior use is absurd on its face.

Finally, Appellant's extensive discussion of the Phase I Municipal Stormwater General Permit issued by the State Department of Ecology is completely irrelevant.<sup>20</sup> The Phase I permit applies to "municipal *separate storm* sewer systems" (emphasis added), so the permit by definition does not deal with the combined sanitary sewage/stormwater situation involved in a CSO.<sup>21</sup> In any event, the Phase I permit does not dictate specific monitoring requirements for Meadowbrook Pond and compliance with the requirements of the permit is not at issue in this appeal in any event.

In sum, there is no SEPA substantive authority that would allow the Examiner to impose the conditions/relief sought by Appellant. Thus, the Examiner must dismiss all of Appellant's SEPA claims as a matter of law.

# C. No shoreline substantial development permit was required and Appellant's remaining argument regarding the "project boundaries" lacks any merit.

Having essentially conceded the core issue in this case, Appellant's Response goes on to address a number of other matters. However, Appellant's remaining contentions are also without merit.

In his Response, Appellant again asserts that the proposal will create impacts at the outfall from which water from the high flow bypass pipeline is discharged into Lake Washington, such that

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> See Lee Decl., ¶ 5. As Mr. Lee points out, even if sanitary sewage somehow reached the pond by accident and thence proceeded through the pipeline, that would not make the pipeline a CSO. Id., ¶ 6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> See Response at pp. 9-11.

Note that, in the block quote at the bottom of page 9 of his Response, Appellant omits the word "storm" between "separate" and "sewer", which misleadingly creates the impression that the Phase I permit might apply to something else. The correct version of the quoted language can be seen on page 9 of the PCHB's decision, available on the Environmental Hearings Office website at http://www.eho.wa.gov/searchdocuments/2008%20archive/pchb%2007-021,07-026,07-027,07-028,07-029,07-030,07-037%20phase%20i%20final.pdf

<sup>26</sup> Id.

the proposal is regulated under the City's Shoreline Master Program (SMC ch. 23.60).<sup>22</sup> However, as set forth in Respondents' Motion to Dismiss, the Examiner does not have jurisdiction over Appellant's claim that a shoreline substantial development permit is required for the project.<sup>23</sup> Moreover, even if that issue were within the Examiner's jurisdiction, Appellant's claim is contrary to applicable law, because the proposal involves no work or activity constituting "substantial development" within the "shorelines." Appellant's Response does not address or rebut any of the foregoing points or cite any legal authority in support of his position that a shoreline substantial development permit is required.

Appellant's Response nonetheless contends that SPU "did not accurately represent the project boundaries" to DPD and that, "[since] DPD was provided incomplete material information on the project boundaries and the environmental effects of the completed project," the Hearing Examiner "has authority to repeal." Appellant suggests that DPD was misled such that DPD did not understand that water leaving the pond and entering the high flow bypass would ultimately reach Lake Washington, because the "project boundaries" were not stated to include the outfall where such water enters Lake Washington. However, to the extent that Appellant suggests that there is some issue related to the "project boundaries" that would call for the Examiner to deny the project under SEPA, Appellant cites no legal authority for that proposition, and such an argument fundamentally misunderstands both the legal framework of SEPA review and the facts of the SEPA review in this case.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> See Response, p. 4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> See Motion to Dismiss, pp. 21-22.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> *Id.*, pp. 20-21. It is undisputed that the proposal does not involve work on the shoreline of Lake Washington, only in the vicinity of Meadowbrook Pond and the adjacent Thornton Creek. The mean annual flow of Thornton Creek is below the level that would bring it within the "shorelines." *See* Motion to Dismiss, p. 20 n.75.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> See Response, p. 3.

RESPONDENTS' REPLY RE: MOTION TO DISMISS - 9

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

 $19 \| \frac{1}{2}$ 

20

21

22

23

The key conceptual unit for SEPA purposes is the "proposal." Agencies use the environmental checklist to assist in making threshold determinations on proposals.<sup>27</sup> The responsible official reviews the checklist and additional information and determines whether the proposal would have a probable significant adverse environmental impact requiring an EIS.<sup>28</sup>

In this case, as part of the Project, SPU does not propose to do any work at the Lake Washington outfall, only work in the vicinity of Meadowbrook Pond.<sup>29</sup> However, the environmental checklist in this case fully describes the entire system into which the Meadowbrook Pond facility fits – including all of the facilities by which water from the high flow bypass pipeline reaches the outfall at Lake Washington – so that the impacts of the proposed work could be adequately evaluated.<sup>30</sup> Indeed, the checklist specifically discusses the fact that "[b]ecause the Pond's live capacity would increase, the amount of water that flows to Lake Washington via the Pond overflow structure and the high flow bypass pipe (rather than via Thornton Creek) would increase slightly" and then goes on to discuss hydraulic modeling performed to determine the existence of resulting impacts.<sup>31</sup> (It bears emphasis that the discussion in the checklist clearly supports a conclusion of minimal impact.) Thus, the checklist unquestionably presented a complete picture and did not, by omitting information, prevent a proper evaluation of environmental impacts.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> SMC 25.05.315.A.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> SMC 25.05.330.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> See Environmental Checklist, February 29, 2012, pp. 3-5, Stevens Decl., Ex. A. <sup>30</sup> *Id.*, p. 4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> *Id.*, p. 12. This discussion relates to the water that enters the high flow bypass via the overflow pipe at the east side of the Pond – a different matter than water entering the upstream inlet to the high flow bypass from Thornton Creek (as noted above, the checklist made clear that the proposed work at the upstream inlet to the bypass would not change the flow characteristics of that inlet).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> Of course, if Appellant wished more detailed discussion of impacts than was contained in the checklist, he should have timely appealed the DNS in an attempt to trigger an EIS, but he did not do so.

In sum, DPD was not presented with an incomplete picture that could or would have misled DPD into not considering whether the Project would have adverse environmental impacts on Lake Washington that should be addressed through an exercise of substantive SEPA authority. Given the contents of the environmental checklist, there is simply no support for Appellant's suggestion that DPD would not have understood (or did not understand) that water from the high flow bypass pipeline would reach Lake Washington. Rather, Appellant simply disagrees with DPD's decision not to exercise its substantive SEPA authority to address adverse impacts that Appellant believes would result from the Project. However, given that (as discussed above), the City lacks substantive SEPA authority to impose the conditions or grant the relief sought by the Appellant, DPD's substantive SEPA decision must be affirmed.<sup>33</sup>

D. The Examiner lacks jurisdiction to consider Appellant's claims related to SMC chapters 25.09, 25.11, and 25.06.

Appellant's statement of appeal raised various claims regarding compliance with SMC chapters 25.09, 25.11, and 25.06. As set forth in Respondents' Motion to Dismiss, the Examiner lacks jurisdiction over those claims.<sup>34</sup> Appellant's Response does not address or rebut any of Respondents' jurisdictional arguments, so the Examiner must dismiss those claims.

#### III. CONCLUSION

Appellant lost his chance to trigger an EIS when he failed to timely appeal the DNS.

Moreover, the City lacks substantive SEPA authority to impose the conditions or grant the relief

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> Appellant suggests that the project plans failed to comply with DPD Client Assistance Memo 103, which deals with the requirements for site plans for MUPs. *See* Response, p. 4. However, there is no requirement that a MUP site plan cover the entire geographic area that potentially could be impacted by a project for purposes of SEPA review.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> See Motion to Dismiss, pp. 18-20, 22-23.

RESPONDENTS' REPLY RE: MOTION TO DISMISS - 12

Peter S. Holmes Seattle City Attorney 600 Fourth Avenue, 4th Floor P.O. Box 94769 Seattle, WA 98124-4769 (206) 684-8200

## **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I certify that on this date, I electronically filed a copy of Respondents' Reply Re: Motion to Dismiss with the Seattle Hearing Examiner using its e-filing system.

I also certify that on this date, a copy of the same document was sent to the following party listed below in the manner indicated:

R. Bruce Struthers 10514 Riviera Place NE Seattle, WA 98125 Appellant

1

2

3

4

5

6

.7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

(X) U.S. First Class Mail, postage prepaid

(X) Email: <u>bruce.struthers@comcast.net</u>

the foregoing being the last known address of the above-named party.

Dated this / day of September, 2012, at Seattle, Washington.

ROSIE LEE HAILEY

RESPONDENTS' REPLY RE: MOTION TO DISMISS - 13

Peter S. Holmes Seattle City Attorney 600 Fourth Avenue, 4th Floor P.O. Box 94769 Seattle, WA 98124-4769 (206) 684-8200